Intellectual Property Rights, Conflict of Laws and International Jurisdiction:  Applicability of ALI Principles in Japan? by Kono, Toshiyuki








Intellectual Property Rights, Conflict of Laws and
International Jurisdiction: Applicability of ALI
Principles in Japan?
Toshiyuki Kono
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Toshiyuki Kono, Intellectual Property Rights, Conflict of Laws and International Jurisdiction: Applicability of ALI Principles in Japan?, 30
Brook. J. Int'l L. (2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol30/iss3/4
File: KonoMACRO.06.16.05.doc Created on: 6/16/2005 3:18 PM Last Printed: 6/17/2005 1:39 PM 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION: 




he American Legal Institute’s (ALI) recent project, 
Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdiction, 
Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes 
(ALI Principles),1 provides an important jumping-off point in 
the discourse on the need for private international law on intel-
lectual property rights (IPR).  This paper will consider the ap-
plicability of the ALI Principles to the Japanese legal system, 
specifically whether these principles could, or should, be suc-
cessfully adopted by Japanese Courts.   
Japan, as a civil law country, rules primarily by statute.2  
Both the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (Code or Civil Pro-
cedure Code) and the Code of Private International Law 
(Hōrei), Japan’s choice of law statute, have been heavily influ-
enced by German law and legal theories.3  Moreover, the Civil 
Procedure Code contains only one provision dealing with inter-
  
 ∗ Professor of Law, Kyushu University.  LL.B (Kyoto), LL.M (Kyoto), an 
advisor of the ALI Project, Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Juris-
diction, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes. 
 1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL 
DISPUTES (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2004) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].  The 
Brooklyn Law School Symposium focused on Preliminary Draft No. 3, which 
was made available to the participants in October 2004. 
 2. See generally Zentaro Kitagawa, Theory Perception—One Aspect of the 
Development of Japanese Civil Law Science (Ronald E. Lee trans.), in 
JAPANESE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 3 (Koichiro Fujikura ed., 1996). 
 3. Kohji Tanabe, The Process of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adver-
sary System, in LAW IN JAPAN (von Mehren ed., 1963), reprinted in THE 
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 506 (Hideo 
Tanaka ed., 1976); BASIC JAPANESE LAWS 443 (Hiroshi Oda et al. eds., 1997). 
T 
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national civil procedure matters,4 and the Code of Private In-
ternational Law, currently undergoing reform, contains only 
thirty-four provisions.5  Therefore, case law plays a very impor-
tant role in these fields, as judicial interpretation of these pro-
visions is necessary for a full explication of the law.  For exam-
ple, the Japanese Supreme Court (Supreme Court) recently 
rendered important interpretative judgments in the fields of 
international jurisdiction and IPR.  Thus, there is good reason 
to consider the applicability of the ALI Principles, which are 
designed to be applied by national courts in various countries, 
in the Japanese system.   
II. INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION OF JAPANESE COURTS AND IPR  
A. International Jurisdiction Generally 
The Japanese Supreme Court clarified its position on interna-
tional jurisdiction on October 16, 1981 in Goto v. Malaysian Air-
line System (Malaysian Airline Case).6  In that case, a Japanese 
national died in a plane crash in Malaysia.  The Court relied on 
the fact that the defendant airline had an office in Tokyo to con-
firm that Japanese courts had jurisdiction over the dispute un-
der the venue provisions of Article Four of the Code.7  Article 
Four at this time provided for jurisdiction wherever the defen-
dant had an establishment.8  According to the Court, Japan’s 
international jurisdiction should be determined in accordance 
with Jori, which can be translated as “fairness” or “justice” in 
English.  Thus, the Court created a two-step process for deter-
mining whether it had jurisdiction over international disputes, 
relying on both concepts of fairness, inherent in Jori, and the 
Code.  This judgment has been criticized, however, since the 
  
 4. MINSOHŌ [Japanese Code of Civil Procedure], art. 118 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter MINSOHŌ].  
 5. See generally Hōrei [Act on the Application of Laws], Law No. 10 of 
1898 [hereinafter Hōrei, reprinted in BASIC JAPANESE LAWS 446 (Hiroshi Oda 
et al. eds., 1997). 
 6. See generally Goto v. Malaysian Airline System, 35 MINSHŪ 1224 (Sup. 
Ct., Oct. 16, 1981) (Japan), 26 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT’L L. 122 (1983) (unofficial 
English translation) (clarifying the Supreme Court’s position on international 
jurisdiction).   
 7. See id. at 123–24.  
 8. See id.  
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Court did not pay attention to the relationship between the case 
and the forum; the victim purchased his ticket in Malaysia and 
the office in Tokyo had nothing to do with the transportation 
contract. 
Since this two-step Jori-Code approach was inflexible, some 
inferior courts added another step, the so-called “special cir-
cumstances test.”9  When special circumstances exist, such that 
the exercise of jurisdiction by Japanese courts would hamper 
fairness between parties and hinder the ability of the parties to 
receive a speedy and fair trial, jurisdiction could be denied.  The 
Supreme Court adopted the “special circumstances” test on No-
vember 11, 1997 in Family Co. Ltd. v. Miyahara.10  Thus, Ja-
pan’s highest court has established a three-step framework to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a dispute: (1) Jori; 
(2) provisions of the Code; (3) the special circumstances test.11 
The Miyahara decision, and the framework it established, 
however, was somewhat ambiguous.  The Court failed to specify 
to which provision of the Code it was referring.  In other words, 
the Court skipped the second step of the analysis.  Because Jori 
itself is such an illusory concept, it appears that Japanese 
courts, in skipping the second step, are relying on only one in-
strument to create a jurisdictional rule, i.e., the special circum-
stances test. Since courts have yet to create clear criteria for 
which elements should be taken into consideration when exam-
ining special circumstances, the Court’s ambiguity in creating 
this three-step analysis could lead to unpredictable results.  
B. International Jurisdiction for IPR Disputes and Japanese 
Case Law 
The next question is whether Japanese case law on interna-
tional jurisdiction is applicable in IPR disputes.  Until very re-
cently, Japanese courts did not have the opportunity to make 
known their stance on international jurisdiction over the in-
fringement of foreign IPR or injunctions.  Although the Tokyo 
District Court could have stated a position on international ju-
  
 9. See generally Family Corp. v. Shin Miyahara, 51 MINSHŪ 4055 (Sup. 
Ct., Nov. 11, 1997) (Japan), 41 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT’L L. 117 (1998) (unofficial 
English translation) (adopting the special circumstances test).    
 10. See generally id.  
 11. See id. at 118–19.   
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risdiction in Nihonmusen Tsushin v. Matsushita Electric, a 
Manchurian patent dispute, the Court instead stressed the ter-
ritorial character of patent law and simply stated that Manchu-
rian patent rights were not protected under Japanese law.12 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fujimoto v. Neuron Co. Ltd. 
(Card Reader Case) on September 26, 2002, is more illuminat-
ing.13  The main issues before the Court were which laws ap-
plied to the infringement of a U.S. patent and whether the 
Court had the authority to issue an injunction halting the 
plaintiff’s production in Japan.14  However, this decision is still 
important for our discussion because the Supreme Court did not 
dismiss the plaintiff’s U.S. patent claim, even though it could 
have held that U.S. courts have exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. 
patent disputes because of the territorial nature of patents.   
In addition, some inferior courts have applied the three-step 
jurisdiction test in IPR-related cases, such as the Tokyo District 
Court in both Ueno Fine Chemical Industry v. The Pharmacia 
K.K. et al, on May 14, 200115 and Yokoyama v. Entercolor Tech-
nology Corporation (Ironman Case) on November 18, 2002.16  In 
  
 12. See generally Nihonmusen Tsushin v. Matsushita Electric, 4 KA 
MINSHŪ 847 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., June 12, 1953).  In 1935, X (Japanese corpora-
tion, plaintiff) bought a Japanese patent from A and registered it in 1936.  In 
the same year, X sought to register the patent in Manchuria; it was registered 
in 1937.  B (Japanese corporation) was licensed to use X’s Japanese patent 
and the license was registered in 1937.  Z manufactured radios, using B’s 
products, and exported them to Manchuria.  X sued Z for damages, arguing 
that Z infringed on X’s Manchurian patent.  The Court did not mention juris-
diction and applied Art. 11, para. 2 of the Code of Private International Law 
(Hōrei), which requires courts to cumulatively apply Japanese law.  See gen-
erally id. (facts of case simplified by author). 
 13. See generally Fujimoto v. Neuron Corp. (Card Reader Case), 56 MINSHŪ 
1551 (Sup. Ct., Sept. 26, 2002) (Japan), 46 JAPANESE ANN. OF INT’L L. 168 
(2003) (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter Card Reader Case].  
 14. See id. at 168–69. 
 15. See generally Ueno Fine Chemical Industry v. The Pharmacia K.K., 
1080 HANREI TAIMUZU 208 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 14, 2001) [hereinafter Ueno 
Fine Chemicals Case].  The plaintiff, a Japanese pharmaceutical company, 
sued a Swedish company and its Japanese subsidiary, asserting that these 
two companies infringed on its Japanese patent.  The Tokyo District Court, 
referring to this three-step test, claimed that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
case because plaintiff did not plead that defendants conducted the tortious act 
in Japan.  See generally id.   
 16. See generally Yokoyama v. Entercolor Technology Corp. (Ironman 
Case), 1812 HANREI JIHŌ 139 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Nov. 18, 2002), 46 JAPANESE 
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both cases, the Tokyo District Court held that it lacked jurisdic-
tion.17  However, it became clear that the three-step test will 
still be used to determine if Japanese courts have jurisdiction in 
IPR cases.  The ALI Principles could be compatible with this 
three-step test, but such compatibility could be affirmed only by 
examining each Principle, which is what the following sections 
do.  In any event, an application of the ALI Principles using the 
facts of these two cases would lead to the same conclusions as 
those reached by the Tokyo District Court because the claims of 
these plaintiffs are rather abusive and Japan does not seem to 
be the appropriate forum.   
C. ALI Principles on International Jurisdiction and Japanese 
Case Law 
1. ALI Principle Section 201:  Defendant’s Forum18 
Article Four of the Code states that the general forum for de-
fendants is either an individual’s domicile19 or, for entities, their 
principal place of business.20  In the Malaysian Airline Case, the 
  
ANN. OF INT’L L. 186 (2003) (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter Iron-
man Case].  The plaintiff, Japanese copyright holder of “Iron man,” sued the 
defendant, who was producing t-shirts in the United States, for injunctive 
relief and compensatory damages based on the infringement of the plaintiff’s 
U.S. copyright.  The Tokyo District Court dismissed the claim because the tort 
occurred in the United States.  See id. at 186–87.  
 17. See Ueno Fine Chemicals Case, supra note 15; Ironman Case, supra 
note 16, at 190. 
 18. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 201.  The current version of the provi-
sion reads as follows:  
(1) A defendant may be sued in the courts of the State where that de-
fendant is habitually resident. 
(2) For the purpose of these Principles, an entity or person other than 
a natural person shall be considered to be habitually resident in the 
State -  
(a) where it has its statutory seat, 
(b) under whose law it was incorporated or formed, 
(c) where it has its central administration, or 
(d) where it has its principal place of business.   
Id. 
 19. MINSOHŌ, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 2. 
 20. Id. art. 4, para. 4.   
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Court adopted this provision of the Code as part of Jori. Strictly 
speaking, the terms “domicile” in the Code and “habitual resi-
dence,” the language adopted by the ALI Principles,21 encom-
pass two different legal notions.  The interpretation of “domi-
cile,” as used in the Code for domestic cases could, however, be 
modified to apply to international cases as well.  Interpretation 
of the Code would then be very similar to Section 201 of the ALI 
Principles.   
A recent judgment by the Tokyo District Court in Coral Co. 
Ltd. v. Marin Bio Co. Ltd. (Coral Powder Case), adopted such a 
usage of the ALI Principles.22  The Court’s decision could be in-
terpreted as an acceptance of Sections 201 and 223(1), which 
allow parties to seek a declaration of rights in the same action 
in which they seek substantive relief.23  In this U.S. patent case, 
both the plaintiff and defendant were Japanese corporations.  
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of coral powder products, sold in 
both the Japanese and American markets; meanwhile, the de-
fendant, the U.S. patent holder of an invention on the produc-
tion of coral powder, warned the plaintiff’s American client that 
plaintiff’s products infringed its U.S. patent.24  The plaintiff 
sought, inter alia, a negative declaratory judgment that the 
plaintiff’s sale of the coral powder product could not be enjoined.  
The plaintiff asserted that its products did not fall within the 
scope of the defendant’s U.S. patent, that the U.S. patent was 
not valid, and that the sale of the product did not infringe the 
defendant’s U.S. patent.25  The issue was whether Japanese 
courts had international jurisdiction over negative declaratory 
judgments.26  The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
Japanese courts should not exercise jurisdiction over U.S. pat-
ent cases and held that, while territoriality might be considered 
in determining the applicable law for injunctive relief, it could 
  
 21. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 201. 
 22. See generally Coral Corp. v. Marin Bio Corp. (Coral Powder Case), 1151 
HANREI TAIMUZU 109 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Oct. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Coral Pow-
der Case].   
 23. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 223(1) (“Actions for a declaration of 
rights may be brought on the same terms as an action seeking substantive 
relief.”).   
 24. See Coral Powder Case, supra note 22.  
 25. See id.  
 26. See id.  
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not be used to deny jurisdiction.27  In applying the Jori special 
circumstances test, the Court stated that the Japanese court 
has jurisdiction since the defendant has its principal place of 
business in Japan, which justifies the exercise of jurisdiction of 
Japanese courts over any kind of claim against the defendant.28  
No special circumstances existed in the case.  Applying Section 
201 of the ALI Principles would lead to the same conclusion.   
2. Section 204:  Infringement Actions29 
The next question is whether the ALI Principles’ rules on in-
fringement actions are transferable to Japanese courts.  Section 
204(1)(a) emphasizes “acts” instead of “effects.”30  In Japan, tort 
actions are generally recognized as providing a jurisdictional 
basis for domestic cases;31 this tortious ground for jurisdiction 
becomes part of Jori when courts determine jurisdiction in in-
ternational disputes.  Japanese courts have jurisdiction in both 
the place where the tortious acts occurred and the place where 
the effects of the acts were felt.32  Thus, courts may find Section 
204 of the ALI Principles too restrictive because it focuses only 
  
 27. See id.  
 28. See id.; MINSOHŌ, supra note 4, art. 4, para. 4. 
 29. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 204.  The current version of the provi-
sion reads as follows:  
(1) A plaintiff may bring an infringement action in the courts of – 
(a) any State where defendant substantially acted (including pre-
paratory acts), or threatened to act, in furtherance of the alleged in-
fringement, or 
(b) any State to which the alleged infringement was directed, includ-
ing those States for which defendant took no reasonable steps to 
avoid acting in or directing activity to that State. 
(2) If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the basis of 
the direction of the alleged infringement to that State, then those 
courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out 
of unauthorized use occurring in that State, unless the injured person 
has his habitual residence or principal place of business in that State.  
Id. 
 30. See id. § 204(1).   
 31. See MINSOHŌ, supra note 4, art. 5, para. 9.  
 32. Hiroshi Takahashi, in KOKUSAISHIHO HANREI HYAKUSEN [Selected 100 
Judgments in the Field of Conflict of Laws] 167 (Yoshiaki Sakurada & Masato 
Dogauchi eds., 2004) (on file with the author).   
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on the acts, and not their effects.  Nevertheless, as Section 204 
applies specifically to IPR disputes, especially in the internet 
environment, while Japanese law is a kind of general rule, 
courts may still be receptive to Section 204(1)(a).  We should 
continue our observation of the development of case law in this 
area.  
But would Section 204(1)(b), which states that infringement 
actions may be brought in “any State to which the alleged in-
fringement was directed,” be acceptable?33  The Supreme Court’s 
decision on June 8, 2001 in Tsuburaya Production v. Y (Ultra-
man Case) is illuminative here.34  Although it is not clear from 
the opinion whether the Court focused on the act itself or its 
effects in reaching its decision to allow jurisdiction, if the Court 
decides to emphasize effects over the act itself, Section 204(1)(b) 
may not be acceptable to Japanese courts.  The facts of this case 
are as follows:  Defendant Y, a Thai national living in Thailand, 
claimed that he was exclusively licensed to use the copyright of 
the TV figure “Ultraman” outside of Japan by X, a Japanese 
company and the copyright holder of Ultraman in Japan.35  X 
licensed A, a Japanese company, to make and sell Ultraman 
products in Southeast Asia.  Y then warned A, through a Hong 
Kong law firm, that the manufacturing of Ultraman products 
would violate Y’s copyright and license.36  X sued Y in Japan for, 
among other things, damages caused by Y’s tortious warnings 
to A.37  The Court held that tort actions provide the jurisdic-
tional basis for a case when the elements of a tort claim are ob-
jectively present.38  As the Court stated, “It is clear the distur-
bance was caused by the Appellee having the warning letter 
delivered to the companies’ addresses in domestic Japan.”39  
  
 33. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 204(1)(b).  
 34. See generally Tsuburaya Productions v. Somporte Saengduencha (Ul-
traman Case), 55 MINSHŪ 727 (Sup. Ct., June 8, 2001) (Japan), 45 JAPANESE 
ANN. OF INT’L L. 151 (2002) (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter Ultra-
man Case] (facts of case simplified by author).  See also Shoichi Okuyama, 
Recent IP News From Japan, WINDS FROM JAPAN, Oct. 2001, at 6 (providing 
summary of Ultraman case). 
 35. See Ultraman Case, supra note 34, at 151. 
 36. See id. at 151–52.  
 37. See id. at 152.  
 38. See id.   
 39. See id. Ultraman Case, supra note 34 (translation by author) (on file 
with author).  For another English translation, see Ultraman Case, supra note 
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Thus, the Court held that a tort claim was objectively present 
and claimed jurisdiction over the suit.  If one follows the lan-
guage in the Court’s opinion, the Court’s requirement of “objec-
tively present” should mean the presence of tortious acts and 
effects and should exclude subjective factors such as negligence 
or intention.  The place where the tortious acts occurred and the 
place where the effects of the acts were felt are identical in this 
case.  Simply being the object of tortious acts would perhaps not 
be sufficient to give courts jurisdiction over a dispute.  On the 
other hand, in Internet-related cases, Japanese courts may de-
cide differently.  
3. Section 206(1)(b):  Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdiction and 
“Presence of Intellectual Property”40 
Section 206(1)(b) of the ALI Principles prohibits the exercise 
of jurisdiction on the basis of “the presence or the seizure in 
that State of intellectual property belonging to the defendant, 
except where the dispute is directly related to that intellectual 
property.”41  One of the six claims in the Ultraman Case, a nega-
tive declaratory judgment that Y was not the copyright holder 
in Japan,42 concerns Section 206(1)(b).  The Court held that a 
Japanese copyright should be deemed located in Japan; thus, 
the Court had jurisdiction based on the location of assets, even 
over a negative declaratory judgment on the copyright holder of 
a Japanese copyright, under Article 5(4) of the Code.43  Section 
206(1)(b) of the ALI Principles would lead to the same conclu-
sion.44  One problem with the Ultraman Case was that jurisdic-
tion was extended over another core issue, i.e., the identity of 
the rightful copyright holder outside of Japan, through the 
  
34, at 153 (“It is clear … there is an objective factual relationship based on the 
disturbance of the Appellant’s business caused by the Appellee having the 
warning letter delivered to the companies’ addresses in domestic Japan.”). 
 40. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 206(1)(b).  The current version of the 
provision reads as follows: “Jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the courts of 
a State on the basis solely of any of the following: … the presence or the sei-
zure in that State of intellectual property belonging to the defendant, except 
where the dispute is directly related to that intellectual property.”  Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42. See Ultraman Case, supra note 34, at 153. 
 43. Id.  
 44. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 206(1)(b).  
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combination of the negative declaratory judgment and the join-
der of claims.  In this way, the restriction of “directly related” in 
Section 206(1)(b) could be bypassed. 
4. Section 220:  Counterclaims and Supplemental Claims45 
In the Ultraman Case, the Supreme Court also affirmed its 
jurisdiction over the following four claims: (1) a declaratory 
judgment that the contract between X and Y was forged; (2) a 
declaratory judgment that X was the copyright holder in Thai-
land; (3) a negative declaratory judgment that Y was not li-
censed to use the work; and (4) an injunction against warning 
letters sent by Y with the statement that Y was the copyright 
holder outside of Japan and that doing business with X would 
violate Y’s exclusive right.46  The Court found that these claims 
were closely related to the other two claims, compensation of 
damages and a negative declaratory judgment on Japanese 
copyright, and held, based on the joinder of claims provision in 
the Code under Article 7, that it had jurisdiction over them as 
well.47  
If Section 220(1) of the ALI Principles had been applied in the 
Ultraman Case, what would the outcome be?  Section 220(1) 
states:  
A court that has jurisdiction to determine a claim under the 
Principles also has jurisdiction to determine all claims be-
tween the parties arising out of the transaction or series of 
transactions or occurrences on which the original claim is 
  
 45. Id. § 220.  The current version of the provision reads as follows:  
(1) A court that has jurisdiction to determine a claim under the Prin-
ciples also has jurisdiction to determine all claims between the par-
ties arising out of the transaction or series of transactions or occur-
rences on which the original claim is based, irrespective of the terri-
torial source of the rights at issue, and irrespective of which party as-
serts them.   
(2) A court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supplemental 
claim unrelated to intellectual property rights if it substantially pre-
dominates over the claims properly within the scope of the Principles.  
Id. 
 46. See Ultraman Case, supra note 34, at 153–54. 
 47. See id. 
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based, irrespective of the territorial source of the rights at is-
sue, and irrespective of which party asserts them.48 
The Reporters explain that  
[T]his section suggests that where courts have subject matter 
authority, they should exercise it to permit litigants to assert 
all their claims arising out of the same transaction or occur-
rence or series of transactions or occurrences.…  Although the 
general approach of these Principles strongly favors the asser-
tion of transactionally related claims in a single action, they 
do not go further and require the joinder of claims....49 
Section 220(1) excludes the joinder of claims.  However, if the 
results of applying Section 220(1) in the Ultraman Case would 
be the same as those reached by the Supreme Court, Section 
220(1), irrespective of the Reporters’ Comments, allows the 
joinder of claims.  If this conclusion does not reflect the Report-
ers’ intentions, they should modify the language of Section 
220(1) accordingly. 
5. Section 225:  Consolidation of Territorial Claims50 
The Supreme Court may be somewhat reluctant to comply 
with Section 225 of the ALI Principles, which calls for the con-
solidation of related pending actions in a single forum.51  The 
Ultraman Case is illustrative.  Y brought suit against X in Thai-
land, asserting that the Ultraman’s Thai copyright was shared 
by X and Y.52  The Supreme Court mentioned this Thai case in 
  
 48. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 220(1) (emphasis added). 
 49. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 65–67 (Comments and Reporters’ 
Notes).  
 50. Id. § 225.  The current version of sections one and two of the provision 
read as follows:  
(1) Upon the motion of an interested party, or sua sponte, the court 
first seized, as determined by § 224(6), should consider consolidation 
of related pending actions and claims in a single forum in order to 
achieve worldwide resolution of a dispute among multiple litigants. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, actions are deemed to be related 
where, irrespective of the territorial source of the rights and the relief 
sought, the claims arise out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions or occurrences.  
Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. See Ultraman Case, supra note 34, at 152. 
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its decision, but since the Court concluded that the core issue in 
the Thai case was different from the action before it, the Court 
did not consider it when deciding jurisdiction.53  Although I do 
not know the details of the Thai case, Sections 225(1) and (2) of 
the ALI Principles seem applicable to these two cases; they 
should have been consolidated, unless the Thai procedure had 
criminal character.  In both the Thai and Japanese suits, the 
claims seemed to arise “out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions or occurrences,” and should therefore have been 
deemed as “related” under Section 225(2) since the origin of the 
dispute between X and Y was the license contract relating to X’s 
copyright outside of Japan.   
III. THE ALI PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES AND IPR  
IN JAPAN  
A. Generally 
Japanese choice of law rules are contained in a statute enti-
tled Hōrei, promulgated in 1898 and modeled after German 
law.54  Thus, Japanese choice of law rules belong to the civil law 
system.  German choice of law rules have a specific structure; 
which law to apply is determined by the type of legal relation-
ship, i.e., whether the action is one in tort or contract, and how 
that action is connected to the forum through one or more con-
necting factors, such as where the offensive act occurred or 
where the effects of that act arose.55  Under this system, foreign 
and domestic laws have equal value, but this equal value is only 
given to private foreign and domestic laws, not public, since 
public laws, unlike private laws, are promulgated to achieve 
specific purposes in each country.56   
Substantive law, which is not applied through choice of law 
mechanisms, has been described by European jurists in various 
ways, such as Selbstgerechte Sachnormen (self-justifying Sub-
stantive Law) or loi d’application immédiate (directly applicable 
  
 53. See id.  
 54. See generally Hōrei, supra note 5. 
 55. Peter Hay, From Rule-Orientation to "Approach" in German Conflicts 
Law The Effect of the 1986 and 1999 Codifications, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 633, 
635, 637 (1999). 
 56. Id. at 639–40, 646. 
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law).57  Public law is a typical example of this genre.  The rele-
vant question, therefore, is whether IP laws, especially patent 
laws, also belong to this genre because government involvement 
is common in this area.  If this question is answered in the af-
firmative, choice of law rules would be irrelevant because pat-
ent law would be, a priori, applicable as substantive law and 
the impact of the ALI Principles on choice of law would largely 
diminish.  
Additionally, territoriality concerns may obviate the need to 
explore choice of law rules in the IP arena.  When territoriality 
is emphasized, only one law is applicable.  Indeed, most IP law-
yers believe that IPR territoriality principles exclude discussion 
of choice of law issues.58  
B. ALI Principles on Applicable Law and Japanese Law 
The Supreme Court, however, has adopted none of these ap-
proaches.59  In fact, the Court held that the territorial nature of 
IPR would not necessarily prevent choice of law issues from 
arising in IP disputes.60  The Court then classified injunction 
and infringement differently:  injunction as the effect of patent 
and infringement as tort.61  The Court held that because the 
Hōrei lacks specific provisions regarding the effect of patent, 
the applicable law, i.e., the law with the closest connection to 
the concerned legal relationship, should be determined by Jori.62  
Thus, the law of the country where the patent is registered 
should be the applicable law.  In this case, it was U.S. law.  Un-
der U.S. patent law, Sections 271(b) and (f), both the party re-
sponsible for the infringement and the person who induced the 
infringement overseas are liable.63  However, according to the 
Court, Japanese patent law does not recognize the extraterrito-
  
 57. See GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 
261 (8th ed. 2000).  
 58. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litiga-
tion: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 
438–39 (2001). 
 59. See generally Card Reader Case, supra note 13 (indicating the Supreme 
Court’s approach in IP disputes). 
 60. See id. at 170.  
 61. See id. at 172–74.  
 62. See id. at 169.  
 63. Patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), 271(f)(1) (2005). 
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rial applicability, and so the policy behind U.S. patent law is too 
foreign and collides with the fundamental values of Japanese 
law.64  Therefore, the Court concluded that the application of 
U.S. patent law would violate Japanese public policy under Ar-
ticle 33 of the Hōrei.65  
For infringements, the Court applied Article 11 of the Hōrei, 
which states that the law of the place where the tort occurred is 
applicable.66  However, under Article 11, Japanese law must be 
cumulatively applied.67  The question is whether the inducing 
acts conducted abroad would constitute a tort under Japanese 
law.  Since Japanese law lacks provisions or conventions that 
set aside the territoriality principle, such inducement would not 
be unlawful.  Therefore, it seems that the Supreme Court has 
abandoned the territoriality principle approach, which excludes 
conflicts of law mechanisms.  In this sense, the Court’s decision 
was an epoch-making judgment.  
C. Section 301:  Existence and Scope of Rights and Remedies68 
Under Section 301(1), the law of registration would apply to 
both patent infringements and remedies.69  If the term “reme-
dies” encompasses not only ex-post, but also ex-ante remedies, 
it would cover both compensatory damages and injunctive re-
  
 64. See Card Reader Case, supra note 13, at 171–72. 
 65. See id.; Hōrei, supra note 5, art. 33. 
 66. Hōrei, supra note 5, art. 11. 
 67. Id. art. 11, para. 2.  
 68. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 301.  The current version of the provi-
sion reads as follows:  
(1) As a general rule, with respect to rights that arise out of registra-
tion, the law applicable to determine the existence, validity and scope 
of those rights and remedies for their infringement is the law of each 
country of registration.   
(2) With respect to other intellectual property rights, the law applica-
ble to determine the existence, validity and scope of the intellectual 
property rights and remedies for their infringement is the law of any 
country where the alleged infringing act has or will significantly im-
pact the market for the work or subject matter at issue.   
(3) With respect to personal rights, the law applicable to determine 
the existence, validity and scope of the rights and remedies for their 
violation is the law of the country where the damage occurred.  
Id. 
 69. See id. 
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lief.  As the Reporters explain, the starting point for the ALI 
Principles is application of the law of the place where the dam-
age occurred.70  But in the digital age, according to the Report-
ers, “[d]esignating the country of initiation of the alleged in-
fringement as the place of the ‘wrongful act’ enjoys the consid-
erable merit of simplifying the action: only one national law 
need apply.”71  If we were to apply Section 301(1) to the Card 
Reader Case, where the main issue was infringement of a U.S. 
patent, U.S. law as the law of registration seems applicable for 
both the awarding of compensatory damages and injunctive re-
lief. 
The Supreme Court, however, treated the case as one of clas-
sic patent infringement; the simplification of applicable law was 
not an important issue for the Court.  Thus, the Court deter-
mined the applicable law for damages and injunctive relief 
separately.72  Ironically, even when focusing on the occurrence of 
damages, a different tactic than that suggested by the Report-
ers of the ALI Principles, the Court ended up applying U.S. law.  
In other words, although the Court took a different approach 
(effects-focusing) from Section 301 of the ALI Principles (acts-
focusing), it reached the same conclusion as would have been 
reached under Section 301.   
In the Coral Powder Case, the Tokyo District Court followed 
the Supreme Court’s lead in the Card Reader Case.  Also in the 
Coral Powder Case, the patent-based injunction was classified 
as the “effect of patent.”73  The Court held that the applicable 
law should be determined by Jori.  Because the laws of the 
country where the patent was registered have the closest rela-
tionship to the patent, those laws should be applicable.  In ap-
plying U.S. patent law, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s 
products did not fall within the scope of the defendant’s patent.74  
Thus, because selling these products did not constitute a viola-
tion of U.S. patent law, no injunction should have been ordered.   
The Court, however, emphasized the tort implications by con-
cluding that the damages sought by the plaintiff were based on 
  
 70. See id. at 109 (Comments & Reporters’ Notes). 
 71. Id.  
 72. See Card Reader Case, supra note 13, at 170–74. 
 73. See generally Coral Powder Case, supra note 22. 
 74. See generally id.  
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the defendant’s tortious warnings to the plaintiff’s business 
partner in the United States.75  Because the Court classified 
these warnings as torts, and since the defendant had sent his 
warnings via e-mails and letters from Japan, Japan was the 
place of the tort.76  The Court took a different approach (acts-
focusing) concerning a tort claim from that of the Supreme 
Court in the Card Reader Case (effects-focusing).  Thus, the 
Law for the Prevention of Unfair Competition was applicable.77  
The Tokyo District Court’s emphasis on the place from which 
warnings were sent, i.e., acts rather than effects, seems to mir-
ror the meaning of Section 301(1). 
  
 75. See generally id.  
 76. See generally id.  
 77. See generally id.  See also Law for the Prevention of Unfair Competi-
tion, Law No. 47 of 1993, amended by Law No. 116 of 1994 (Japan), 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/ASIAcom/pdf/jplaw.pdf (unofficial translation). 
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D. Section 315, Transfer of Title and Grants of Licenses78:   
Employee’s Invention and Article 35 of Japanese Patent Law79 
– Directly Applicable Law? 
  
 78. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 315.  Sections one and two of the provi-
sion state: 
(1) Except for the transferability of rights and transfers by operation 
of law, the law applicable to transfer of ownership in, or a grant of a 
license to use, intellectual property rights is the law designated by 
the parties to the contract. 
(2) In the absence of a contractual choice of law clause, the applicable 
law is that of the country with the closest connection to the contract. 
It shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected to the 
country where the assignor or the licensor has its habitual residence 
or its main business establishment.   
Id. 
 79. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 35, amended by 
Law No. 220 of 1999, (Japan) [hereinafter Japanese Patent Law], http:// 
www.jpo.go.jp/shoukaie/patent.htm#35.  The current version of this provision 
is as follows:  
(1) An employer, a legal entity or a state or local public entity (here-
inafter referred to as the "employer, etc.") shall have a non-exclusive 
license on the patent right concerned, where an employee, an execu-
tive officer of a legal entity or a national or local public official (here-
inafter referred to as the "employee, etc.") has obtained a patent for 
an invention which by reason of its nature falls within the scope of 
the business of the employer, etc. and an act or acts resulting in the 
invention were part of the present or past duties of the employee, etc. 
performed on behalf of the employer, etc. (hereinafter referred to as 
an "employee's invention") or where a successor in title to the right to 
obtain a patent for an employee's invention has obtained a patent 
therefor.  
(2) In the case of an employee's invention made by an employee, etc. 
which is not an employee's invention, any contractual provision, ser-
vice regulation or other stipulation providing in advance that the 
right to obtain a patent or the patent right shall pass to the employer, 
etc. or that he shall have an exclusive license on such invention shall 
be null and void.  
(3) The employee, etc. shall have the right to a reasonable remunera-
tion when he has enabled the right to obtain a patent or the patent 
right with respect to an employee's invention to pass to the employer, 
etc. or has given the employer, etc. an exclusive right to such inven-
tion in accordance with the contract, service regulations or other 
stipulations.  
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Last, it is worth mentioning “employee’s invention,” one of 
the hottest issues in Japanese IP law.  Such a discussion raises 
fundamental issues regarding choice of law.  Each country 
treats employee’s invention issues differently.  Germany has a 
special labor law (Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz),80 while in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, it is a matter of con-
tract law.81  The relevant questions for us are twofold:  (1) how 
to apply these laws, and (2) how to determine the territorial 
scope of these laws. 
Article 35(3) of Japanese Patent Law provides that employees 
shall have the right to a reasonable remuneration when they 
pass to their employers the right to obtain patents for their in-
ventions or have given employers the exclusive right to such 
inventions.82  The question raised is whether calculation of re-
muneration is a right vested only in Japanese patent holders or 
if the right to obtain a foreign patent should be included.  In 
other words, does the right to obtain a foreign patent fall within 
the scope of Article 35?  Although scholars and courts are di-
vided on this issue, I believe that the scope of this provision is 
limited to Japanese patents.  Since it is quite clear from its his-
tory that this provision was introduced to protect employees, it 
is by its nature much like labor law.  The protection of employ-
ees should not depend upon the labor policies of foreign coun-
tries.  Thus, it should be understood as “directly applicable 
law,” and applied when the labor, i.e., the research necessary 
for the invention, occurs in Japan. 
Section 315, governing the transfer of title and grants of li-
censes,83 is the relevant ALI Principle concerning this issue.  
The Reporters’ Comments indicate that it seems to cover em-
  
(4) The amount of such remuneration shall be decided by reference to 
the profits that the employer, etc. will make from the invention and 
to the amount of contribution the employer, etc. made to the making 
of the invention.   
Id. (This provision has been amended and the new version will enter into force 
in April 2005; it will remain essentially unchanged, however). 
 80. Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererfindungen (Arbeitnehmererfindungsge-
setz), v. 18.1.2002 (BGBl. I S.414) (F.R.G.).   
 81. 30 C.J.S. Employer § 118 (2004); Patents Act, 1977, c. 37,  §§ 39–43 
(Eng.). 
 82. Japanese Patent Law, supra note 79, art. 35(3).   
 83. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 315.   
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ployee’s inventions.84  However, the section addresses inventions 
only as a matter of contract.  Therefore, according to the ALI 
Principles, the parties could choose the applicable law in their 
agreement concerning the transfer of IP.  This does not address 
the protection of employees, however.  If Japanese courts are to 
accept Section 315, they should also apply Article 35 of Japa-
nese Patent Law in order to protect employees who conduct 
their research in Japan.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
Comparing the ALI Principles with some recent decisions by 
Japanese courts makes it clear that some ALI Principles are 
easily acceptable to Japanese courts while others should be 
modified to clarify their scope.  On the other hand, since the 
ALI Principles are influenced by the new IPR environment, 
such as digitization, Japanese courts may want to adopt rules 
similar to the ALI Principles when they face IP issues related to 
the new environment.  
 
  
 84. Id. at 131 (Comments & Reporters’ Notes) (“The intangible subject 
matter of the transfer or license has been developed by the transferor or licen-
sor in its factories, workshops or studios.  It is aimed at working or being used 
in a given technical or social environment.”).  
 
